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This issue of the UC Irvine Law Review contains sixteen articles based on 
papers originally presented at the second “Law As . . .” symposium, held  
March 9–11, 2012, at the University of California, Irvine School of Law. Those 
works join eighteen articles published by the UC Irvine Law Review in September 
2011, following the inaugural “Law As . . .” symposium held in April 2010.1 
Together, the two collections (and those to come) comprise a body of research 
that I believe represents the beginnings of a distinct trajectory in interdisciplinary 
legal scholarship. This trajectory deploys history as an interpretive practice—that 
is, as a theory, a methodology, and even a philosophy—by which to engage in 
research on law. Simultaneously it proposes history as a substantive arena in which 
other interpretive research practices—those of anthropology, literature, political 
economy, political science, political theory, rhetoric, and sociology—can engage 
with law. The result is a capacious interdisciplinary jurisprudence inflected by 
history rather than by the positivism of the social sciences, which holds out the 
possibility, a century after their divorce, of reuniting metaphysics with materiality.2 
The first “Law As . . .” symposium opened the engagement by proposing 
that legal historians reconsider their default participation in the theory and practice 
of “law and.” Invented in the early 1900s in the distinction between “law in the 
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books” and “law in action,” grounded in legal realism, and popularized by the law 
and society movement, “law and” relies on empirical context to situate law as a 
domain of activity. It explains law through its relations to cognate but distinct 
domains of action (society, polity, economy, culture) by parsing the interactions 
among them. Legal history conceived in accordance with this approach attempts 
to reveal the effect of law, or to explain the reality of law, by assessing change over 
time in law vis-à-vis that contextualizing domain (society, polity, economy, culture) 
from which it is held relationally distinct.3 Why is this problematic? After all, as 
Catherine Fisk and Robert Gordon wrote in their foreword to the first collection, 
the “and” stands “as a reminder that one should study law not as distinct from all 
else, as entirely self-contained and self-generating, or as a ‘brooding omnipresence 
in the sky.’”4 Unfortunately, “what may be a matter of rhetorical convenience 
becomes a crucial but largely unexamined ontological statement and cognitive 
habit.”5 The result is that “‘law and’ scholarship perpetuates the idea that, even 
though law is situated in society, law is distinct from society and can, or must, be 
studied in relation to it.”6 
The goal of the first symposium was to exert critical pressure on legal history 
by forcing it out of its mainstream socio-legal comfort zone, first by proposing 
that explanations of law “are not to be found, either necessarily or sufficiently, in 
its relations to other things,”7 and second by requiring that legal history interact 
with scholars engaged in distinctively interdisciplinary projects in the realm of legal 
studies—some conceived historically, some not. It was successful. During two 
beautiful spring days in Irvine, 150 people gathered to discuss sixteen papers 
divided among four panels. Four commentators led the discussion—John 
Comaroff, Robert Gordon, Morton Horwitz, and Christopher Tomlins—assisted 
by four moderators—Catherine Fisk, Risa Goluboff, Ariela Gross, and Hendrik 
Hartog. The panelists addressed a lively audience made up of faculty, graduate 
students, and law students from the University of California, Irvine, and from 
other universities within the region, joined by participants from throughout the 
United States, Canada, and beyond. 
Quite intentionally, the second symposium was organized rather differently, 
as an extended workshop without a large audience, to maximize the opportunity 
for intensive discussion among focused and committed interlocutors.8 Once more, 
papers were commissioned and circulated in advance. Once more, we met over 
two full days, although this time we hunched over a table in a cramped seminar 
 
3. Symposium, supra note 1; Tomlins & Comaroff, supra note 2, at 1040–41. 
4. Catherine L. Fisk & Robert W. Gordon, Foreword, “Law As . . .”: Theory and Method in Legal 
History, 1 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 519, 520 (2011) (citation omitted). 
5. Id. 
6. Id. 
7. Tomlins & Comaroff, supra note 2, at 1041.  
8. Symposium, “Law As . . .” II, History As Interface for the Interdisciplinary Study of Law, 4 U.C. 
IRVINE L. REV. 1 (2014). 
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room rather than a large auditorium. We discussed eighteen papers paired in nine 
sessions, each lasting ninety minutes.9 Each session began with a commissioned 
commentary. I know that I speak for all the participants in underlining here the 
immense contribution to the success of the event that our commentators made. 
As well as participating fully in the event as a whole, each of them—Malick 
Ghachem, Jon Goldberg-Hiller, Ariela Gross, Ron Levi, Bill Maurer, Aziz Rana, 
Norm Spaulding, Steven Wilf, and Constantin Fasolt—engaged intensively and at 
length with the papers they had been asked to discuss. 
Whether invited back as commentators or once again asked to offer papers, 
there were, again intentionally, several “repeat players” from the 2010 
symposium.10 Our objective, after all, is less to hold symposia for their own sake 
than to establish a movement with a core sense of continuity and lasting 
intellectual and personal kinship. But we also want to extend our circle to as many 
new participants as feasible. Of the sixteen articles included in this collection, fully 
three-quarters are by authors new to the “law as . . .” enterprise. 
In the first collection, the dimensions of that enterprise were thoroughly 
traversed in two essays—a foreword and an afterword—in which the conveners 
of the opening symposium, Catherine Fisk and Christopher Tomlins, joined with 
two of the commentators, Robert Gordon and John Comaroff, to offer their 
thoughts on what “law as . . .” meant, what the first symposium had achieved, and 
what directions for future work the collection suggested. Fisk and Gordon 
concluded that the first symposium had shown law was woven so deeply into 
consciousness that, paradoxically, the first step for critical practice actually had to 
be to identify it “at work.”11 Law was not outside life but “deep within it,” in no 
sense “external to suffering, privation, inequality, and oppression.”12 For our part, 
Comaroff and I stressed that the shift to “law as . . .” was an opportunity to think 
outside the “long-familiar Weberian categories and trajectories” that have 
dominated both history and social science.13 Writing the afterword gave Comaroff 
and me the opportunity to have “the last word,” but we pointedly declined to be 
programmatic. To us, “law as . . .” was “neither a manifesto nor a prescriptive 
statement of intent.”14 Nor was it intended to become a paradigm. 
 
9. Of the eighteen papers presented, sixteen appear in this collection. Two of the 
participants—Hilary Schor and Yishai Blank—were prevented by other professional and personal 
commitments from revising their papers for inclusion here. 
10. Ariela Gross, Shai Lavi, Kunal Parker, Norm Spaulding, Christopher Tomlins, Mariana 
Valverde, and Steven Wilf were all on both programs in one or other capacity, although Steven Wilf 
was only a semi-repeat player, having been prevented from actually attending the first conference by 
the disruption to air travelers on the eastern seaboard between the fifteenth and twentieth of April 
2010 caused by the eruption of the Icelandic volcano Eyjafjallajökull. Catherine Fisk, co-convener of 
the first conference, was prevented by other commitments from co-convening or attending the 
second conference. 
11. Fisk & Gordon, supra note 4, at 541. 
12. Id. 
13. Tomlins & Comaroff, supra note 2, at 1041. 
14. Id. 
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Were it to pretend to any of these things, our best gift to the reader 
would be to declare it dead and done with. It is no more than “an eddy in 
the stream of becoming” that stands, at most, for an attempt to open up 
a perspective. It is also, as its ellipsis suggests, a perspective in progress, 
unfinished, incomplete, becoming—hopefully in both senses of the word[, 
its serial periods marking an ongoing process rather than a full stop].15 
Our hope then was simply that the essays comprising that first collection would 
demonstrate at the very least that “law as . . .” was “not without its uses, its 
promises, its provocations.”16 
In an important sense, this second collection serves to index whether the 
perspective we desired to open up in 2010 is likely to have any lasting effect on 
legal scholarship. Promise and provocation are best revealed by use, not by the 
windy claims of sponsors. That being the case, it is best to let the essays speak for 
themselves. I shall offer only a brief introduction here, referring those who seek 
more extended disquisition on the meaning of “law as . . .” to the foreword and 
afterword to the first collection.17 
I. TEMPORALITIES 
We begin with four essays that, to a greater extent than elsewhere in the 
collection, undertake an explicit interrogation of history, particularly legal history, 
as a critical practice. “Every Law Tells a Story: Orthodox Divorce in Jewish and 
Islamic Legal Histories,” Lena Salaymeh’s examination of divorce in Jewish and 
Islamic legal systems in the premodern era, offers a startlingly new account of 
women’s agency in seeking and acquiring divorce in both religious traditions. 
Arguing against the conventional grain of linear and incremental acquisition of 
rights over time, Salaymeh shows that Jewish and Muslim women in the late 
antique period (250–750 CE) had relatively more access to divorce than women in 
the medieval era (750–1450 CE). Her analysis stresses that, if formal legal systems 
are studied from “primarily internal perspectives,” the likely outcome will be the 
generation of accounts of their development that reinforce the narratives that 
orthodoxy tells about itself in order to justify itself. Salaymeh favors historicism 
and thick description—a radical contextualization of law that both establishes 
“that any statement of ‘what the law is’ is embedded within a complex historical 
narrative generated by jurists,”18 and simultaneously undermines that narrative. 
Salaymeh’s principal empirical finding is that the Jewish and Islamic legal systems 
 
15. Id. at 1079 (citation omitted). 
16. Id. 
17. Several authors in this collection offer their own thoughts on the matter too. See, e.g., Shai 
J. Lavi, Humane Killing and the Ethics of the Secular: Regulating the Death Penalty, Euthanasia, and Animal 
Slaughter, 4 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 297, 323 (2014); Brook Thomas, Reconstructing the Limits of Schmitt’s 
Theory of Sovereignty: A Case for Law As Rhetoric, Not As Political Theology, 4 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 239, 242 
(2014). 
18. Lena Salaymeh, Every Law Tells a Story: Orthodox Divorce in Jewish and Islamic Legal Histories, 4 
U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 19, 21 (2014). 
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of antiquity and of the medieval period have a profoundly interwoven character. 
Her principal contribution to our collective project is, in effect, to reaffirm the 
salience of historicism as a potent antifoundational tool. It is worth remembering 
that where orthodoxies reign, contextualization can be powerful acid. 
Renisa Mawani’s “Law as Temporality: Colonial Politics and Indian Settlers” 
also turns to historical context to examine current scholarly engagement with the 
“Asian settler” question—that is, broadly, the question of whether Asian 
migrations within European empires (particularly the British Empire) should be 
considered commensurate in effect and intent to European colonialism. But 
conceptually, Mawani’s essay is less dependent upon historical contextualization 
than upon the development of an argument for considering the “juridical-racial 
taxonomies” bred to organize and manage colonial populations rendered racially 
polyglot by serial migrations as “temporal divisions that fomented legal subjectivities 
ascribed with unequal degrees of worth and value, disparate rights to the land, 
and . . . distinct claims to the imperial polity.”19 The quality of temporality that 
Mawani seeks to mobilize cannot, she argues, be captured by simple historicity, by 
placing law in historical context, for law produces and organizes time, and to that 
extent creates the historical contexts into which we would insert it. Mawani wants 
us instead to attend to what she terms the “doubling” of time: “the tensions 
between law’s creation of time, including the legal production of colonial-legal 
subjectivities, and the challenges posed by British Indians whose claims as settlers 
were animated by their own lived times of colonialism—including migration and 
indenture—and which animated their claims to belonging.”20 Indeed, doubling is 
likely to prove but a way station on a road to discovering and charting a whole 
plurality of temporalities huddled beneath the overbearing incessant pendulum-
swing of metropolitan legality. 
In “Routine Exceptionality: The Plenary Power Doctrine, Immigrants, and 
the Indigenous Under U.S. Law,” Susan Coutin, Justin Richland, and Véronique 
Fortin join Renisa Mawani in problematizing history (and law)’s assumptions of 
time. Indeed, as their subtitle suggests, Coutin, Richland, and Fortin are 
negotiating similar empirical terrain. Their particular concern is to confront the 
“always already”-ness of plenary power, the “annunciatory-yet-citational” quality 
of its creation as a form of self-evident authority whose very self-evidence 
confirms its prior instantiation simply by evidencing its necessity.21 As in Mawani’s 
essay, the effects of this atemporal temporality of law are felt with particular sting 
by those whose own lived temporalities do not accord—or cannot be made to 
accord—with its regime, and who are thereby rendered routinely exceptional: 
 
19. Renisa Mawani, Law As Temporality: Colonial Politics and Indian Settlers, 4 U.C. IRVINE L. 
REV. 65, 68 (2014). 
20. Id. at 70. 
21. Susan Bibler Coutin et al., Routine Exceptionality: The Plenary Power Doctrine, Immigrants, and the 
Indigenous Under U.S. Law, 4 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 97, 100 (2014). 
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immigrants, the indigenous, and islanders.22 Coutin, Richland, and Fortin refer us 
to administrative activities as sites of routine excepting, which they describe 
powerfully as moments of irresolution, of back-and-forth movement “between 
rule and exception, law and the extralegal . . . promise and revocation,” 
movements that are for them the essence of plenary power.23 In those same 
irresolute moments, we can also detect the overbearing swing of metropolitan 
legality’s pendulum, the interminable ticking that at once registers the relentless 
passage of a particular form of time and the oppressive endlessness of the wait for 
it to cease. 
In the final essay in this initial group, “Repetition in History:  
Anglo-American Legal Debates and the Writings of Walter Bagehot,” Kunal 
Parker helps us see endlessness somewhat differently, potentially less oppressively. 
As Parker notes, repetition is a peculiarly difficult temporality for history to 
contemplate—or perhaps we should amend that to some histories, notably the 
progressive histories of occidental modernity. For, as Parker shows us, law’s own 
temporality, and thus its sense of history, has been variable. The early modern 
common law, for example, confronted its own immemoriality not with concern 
but indifference, or even with active aesthetic (not to say political) regard. It is the 
modern positivist state—the state bequeathed to the nineteenth century and 
beyond by the French Revolution—that becomes impatient with repetition, that 
seizes upon direction, and organizes time and history into periods, progress, 
and—of course—power, in the service of achieving directionality. In turn, 
directionality attracts its own skeptics, notably Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., who 
detects in time and history nothing but the corrosive historicism that we have 
already seen Lena Salaymeh apply to great effect in the first essay in this 
collection.24 Holmes’s critique of directional history, however, leaves nothing in its 
place but a coldly pragmatic statism.25 It is not Holmes in this instance, but 
 
22. Id. at 115. See generally Sarah H. Cleveland, Powers Inherent in Sovereignty: Indians, Aliens, 
Territories, and the Nineteenth Century Origins of Plenary Power over Foreign Affairs, 81 TEX L. REV. 1, 1–15 
(2002); Christopher Tomlins, The Supreme Sovereignty of the State: A Genealogy of Police in American 
Constitutional Law, from the Founding Era to Lochner, in POLICE AND THE LIBERAL STATE 33, 33–53 
(Markus D. Dubber & Mariana Valverde eds., 2008). 
23. Coutin et al., supra note 21, at 101. 
24. Salaymeh, supra note 18, at 21–22. On Holmes, see Kunal M. Parker, Law “In” and “As” 
History: The Common Law in the American Polity, 1790–1900, 1 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 587, 588–91 (2011). 
See generally KUNAL M. PARKER, COMMON LAW, HISTORY, AND DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA,  
1790–1900: LEGAL THOUGHT BEFORE MODERNISM 1–24, 219–78 (2011). 
25. See Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 457 (1897) 
(“When we study law we are not studying a mystery but a well known profession. We are studying 
what we shall want in order to appear before judges, or to advise people in such a way as to keep 
them out of court. The reason why it is a profession, why people will pay lawyers to argue for them or 
to advise them, is that in societies like ours the command of the public force is intrusted to the judges 
in certain cases, and the whole power of the state will be put forth, if necessary, to carry out their 
judgments and decrees. People want to know under what circumstances and how far they will run the 
risk of coming against what is so much stronger than themselves, and hence it becomes a business to 
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another critic, Walter Bagehot, who fascinates Parker with his apparent 
commitment to contradictory philosophies of history—on the one hand, 
teleological directionality, on the other, “showing that we can never escape 
custom, repetition, and imitation.”26 Parker finds irony in Bagehot’s embrace of 
these incommensurables, while also noting that Bagehot’s very ability to straddle 
both direction and repetition serves as a lesson in the limits of what current 
historians so often announce as their “default” model, change over time. 
II. FUGACITIES 
Essays in the collection’s second group share two characteristics. First, they 
are all concerned in one form or another with the phenomenon of human 
property, notably slavery. Second, they all attempt to catch fleeting glimpses of law 
in unanticipated historical association with that property. 
We begin with Michelle McKinley’s “Standing on Shaky Ground: Criminal 
Jurisdiction and Ecclesiastical Immunity in Seventeenth-Century Lima,  
1600–1700.” An accomplished archival ethnographer, McKinley charts the lives of 
Lima’s slaves as revealed in a major collection of ecclesiastical immunity 
(sanctuary) proceedings, which are in effect also criminal procedure cases, 
complete with multiple records of confession under torture. The records grant her 
access to the criminal lives and networks of the urban poor, among whom Lima’s 
slaves lived and worked. They “reveal the perennial struggle in consolidating states 
between, on the one hand, ecclesiastical ideals of clemency and intercession, and, 
on the other, secular imperatives of punishment and deterrence” upon which, in 
Lima’s case, “the colonial racial grammar of the criminal depravity of black and 
mulatto men” is a constant overlay.27 But there is more besides. We are familiar 
with the slave who is the helpless subject of criminal law’s “naked disciplinary 
power.”28 What of the slave of McKinley’s ecclesiastical records—“simultaneously 
Catholic and potentially treacherous”29—or of her notarial sources (analyzed 
elsewhere30), in which slaves appear “industrious, enterprising, and beatific”31? 
These contrasting glimpses lead McKinley to take on the challenge of reexamining 
Orlando Patterson’s famous conclusion that slavery means social death.32 
 
find out when this danger is to be feared. The object of our study, then, is prediction, the prediction 
of the incidence of the public force through the instrumentality of the courts.”). 
26. Kunal M. Parker, Repetition in History: Anglo-American Legal Debates and the Writings of Walter 
Bagehot, 4 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 121, 137 (2014). 
27. Michelle A. McKinley, Standing on Shaky Ground: Criminal Jurisdiction and Ecclesiastical 
Immunity in Seventeenth-Century Lima, 1600–1700, 4 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 141, 143 (2014). 
28. Id. at 151. 
29. Id. at 152. 
30. Michelle A. McKinley, Till Death Do Us Part: Testamentary Manumission in Seventeenth-Century 
Lima, Peru, 33 SLAVERY & ABOLITION 381, 381–96 (2012). 
31. McKinley, supra note 27, at 151. 
32. See ORLANDO PATTERSON, SLAVERY AND SOCIAL DEATH: A COMPARATIVE STUDY  
38–45 (1982). 
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McKinley will not go so far as to accord the slave agency.33 But she does argue 
that the slave can be treated as a “protagonist,”34 which is in effect to recognize 
that the slave was a participant in the living of a life. Slave protagonism is to be 
found in the sanctuary cases in the limited protective spaces opened by the 
competition of ecclesiastical with secular criminal sovereignties. But McKinley 
refuses to exaggerate protagonism’s extent. Slaves might have situated themselves 
in the spaces opened, but they remained slaves, utterly dependent upon the 
actions of others for their protagonism to bear fruit. 
Where McKinley’s glimpses of law’s multiple intersections with slavery are 
culled from an extensive record collection, mine (Christopher Tomlins, “Demonic 
Ambiguities: Enchantment and Disenchantment in Nat Turner’s Virginia”) are 
produced by an intertextual reading of a single document, one of the best known 
in the history of American slavery, Thomas Ruffin Gray’s 1831 pamphlet entitled 
The Confessions of Nat Turner.35 By conjoining Gray’s Confessions with Walter 
Benjamin’s “Capitalism as Religion”36 and Max Weber’s “Science as a Vocation,”37 
I attempt to create successive original standpoints, or optics, from which or 
through which one may catch novel glimpses of Turner’s rebellion, and of Turner 
himself. Both Benjamin and Weber also furnish optics on law, particularly on the 
meaning of the “full faith and credit”38 that the Southampton County Court 
demanded for its decision to hang Turner for his attempted rebellion. Like the 
“demonic ambiguity”39 inherent in the duality of debt and guilt that, for Benjamin, 
confirms the existence of a religious (specifically a Christian) structure in 
capitalism, the conjunction of faith and credit has its own demonic ambiguity, 
simultaneously sacralizing and secularizing legal authority. In the maelstrom of the 
Turner Rebellion, as indeed in the capitalism it threatened, one encounters these 
demonic ambiguities (guilt and debt, faith and credit) collapsing into one another, 
fusing in an overwhelming and atemporal simultaneity that is at once economic 
and juridical, moral and psychological, profane and sacral. This simultaneity—and 
Turner’s momentary disruption of it—is my essay’s chief concern. 
Something of the same attention to fusion and collapse is to be found in 
Brenna Bhandar’s “Property, Law, and Race: Modes of Abstraction,” the third 
essay in this group. It has long been observed that abstraction is the means by 
 
33. McKinley, supra note 27, at 153. 
34. Id. 
35. THOMAS R. GRAY, THE CONFESSIONS OF NAT TURNER, THE LEADER OF THE LATE 
INSURRECTION IN SOUTHAMPTON, VA, reprinted as THE ORIGINAL CONFESSIONS OF NAT TURNER 
1 (1967). 
36. 1 WALTER BENJAMIN, Capitalism as Religion, in WALTER BENJAMIN: SELECTED 
WRITINGS, 1913–1926, at 288, 288–91 (Marcus Bullock & Michael W. Jennings eds., 1996). 
37. MAX WEBER, Science as a Vocation, in FROM MAX WEBER: ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGY 129, 
129–56 (H.H. Gerth & C. Wright Mills eds. & trans., 1946). 
38. THE CONFESSIONS OF NAT TURNER AND RELATED DOCUMENTS 42–43 (Kenneth S. 
Greenberg ed., 1996). 
39. 1 BENJAMIN, supra note 36, at 289. 
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which law produces its universals, just as it is the means to resolve the daily 
confrontation in the moment of judgment between universal norms and particular 
claims. Here, however, Bhandar considers abstraction not in its relation to 
universality, but as the very basis of the modern legal form of property that 
emerged in the late seventeenth century to mark the commodification of land, and 
of the near-simultaneous appearance of a modern discourse of race. In the case of 
property, ownership of land hitherto conceived concretely in terms of hereditary 
title and inheritance (birthright) was reconceived by John Locke as the expression 
of abstract labor. In the eighteenth century, Jeremy Bentham further separated 
ownership from physical possession, occupation, or even use, by expressing 
ownership as a relation based on the expectation that one would be able to use the 
property as one wished. In both cases (particularly the latter), the abstraction is 
both realized and confirmed by law, which secures the property relation, or guards 
and protects the expectation. Though actual possession and occupation precede 
the shift to abstraction, the shift itself denies the possibility that they could 
provide justification or a basis for ownership. Yet possession remains central to 
the lifeworld of property; notions of privilege and entitlement—the possession of 
particular qualities and characteristics that constitute the prerequisites of one’s 
ability to own—shape one’s property consciousness. It is here we catch our 
glimpse of slavery and, in particular, of the emergence of race. First, Bhandar 
underlines the decisive significance of race to the very reconceptualization of 
property as abstraction. Locke’s propertization of land as abstract labor is, 
famously, a simultaneous denial of property to the concrete North American 
indigenous possessor/occupier—the “wild Indian”;40 simultaneously, abstract race 
(“whiteness”) becomes property. Private property and the racial are, she argues, 
co-emergent.41 Second, as Stephen Best and Ian Baucom—among others—have 
shown, slavery and the figure of the slave are central to the eighteenth century’s 
emergent forms of abstract property, just as they are to the system of credit and 
debt that enabled finance capital decisively to collapse real and intangible forms of 
value in the body of the slave.42 Focusing in particular on Baucom, Bhandar asks 
whether accounts such as his can (or should) also explain how abstraction 
operated in the construction of a particular discourse of the racial. Her essay 
requires us to ask how the racial—as a political-economic relation, as embodied 
quality, as metaphysical attribute—might be more cogently addressed in current 
theorizations of abstraction and property ownership. 
The final essay in this group is Michael Meranze’s “Hargrave’s Nightmare 
 
40. JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 19, 21–30 (C.B. Macpherson ed., 
Hackett Publ’g Co. 1980) (1690). 
41. Brenna Bhandar, Property, Law, and Race: Modes of Abstraction, 4 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 203, 
204 (2014). 
42. IAN BAUCOM, SPECTERS OF THE ATLANTIC: FINANCE CAPITAL, SLAVERY, AND THE 
PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY 11–14 (2005); STEPHEN M. BEST, THE FUGITIVE’S PROPERTIES: LAW 
AND THE POETICS OF POSSESSION 1–13 (2004). 
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and Taney’s Dream.” Following up on a near-revolution in historical scholarship 
on the founding era, which has eviscerated the long-ascendant “ideological” 
account of the making of the American Republic and irreducibly established the 
centrality of slavery in “the actual political and legal accommodations made to 
create and expand the Republic,”43 Meranze draws to our attention a logical but so 
far unasked corollary question—accepting that slavery was central to the U.S. 
Constitution, why was it so? In other words, what did the Constitution do for 
slavery? The short answer is that it enabled a transition “from imagined weakness 
to consolidated strength,”44 meaning, in turn, that the subsequent preeminence of 
slavery in the history of the United States was “an effect of the Constitution.”45 
Meranze makes the point by tracking the legal and political history of slavery from 
the early 1770s until the Founding Era, with a coda that reaches forward to Dred 
Scott v. Sandford.46 Lord Mansfield’s decision in Somerset’s case,47 restricted though 
it was, weakened slavery’s metropolitan foundations; more or less simultaneously, 
William Blackstone rendered it a merely local institution, vulnerable to 
parliamentary determination.48 Such transatlantic threats, however indirect, meant 
that the survival of American slavery became dependent on the support of its own 
state. The construction of that state in the aftermath of the American Revolution 
is Meranze’s substantive subject, but we must be sure not to miss his larger point, 
that the constitutional order constructed for slavery was one that in a legal-political 
sense subordinated all to slavery. The nightmare (and dream) of Meranze’s title is 
that of slavery uncontained, the entire complex of American law reduced to a 
symptom of a given racial order. Meranze here joins Bhandar in providing us a 
glimpse of the profoundly unsettling foundation of nineteenth-century American 
legalities, and, by extension, of our own. 
III. INNOVATIONS 
Each of the essays in the collection’s third group engages in, or examines, 
innovation—literally, the alteration of what is established (a conventional wisdom, 
an accepted concept, an intellectual strategy or theory) by the introduction of new 
elements or forms. In “Reconstructing the Limits of Schmitt’s Theory of 
Sovereignty: A Case for Law As Rhetoric, Not as Political Theology,” Brook 
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Thomas examines the phenomenon of Weimar (and later Nazi) jurist Carl 
Schmitt’s remarkable following in current legal and political theory. Thomas 
investigates the origins of Schmitt’s own thinking, drawing to our attention the 
significant influence of Civil War and Reconstruction-era events on Schmitt’s 
formulation of a theory of “sovereignty” refracted in the prism of “exception”;49 
and he places Schmitt in transatlantic dialogue with, in particular, the largely 
forgotten American political scientist John W. Burgess, whose own work on 
sovereignty was also deeply influenced by the Civil War and Reconstruction. 
Burgess defined a sovereign state as any “portion of mankind”50 organized into an 
undivided political unit exercising “original, innate, and legally unlimited power to 
command and enforce obedience by the infliction of penalties for disobedience.”51 
State and government are not coterminous. Government may be limited. “But the 
unlimited power of the state limits governments. ‘[T]he government is not the 
sovereign organization of the state. Back of the government lies the constitution; 
and back of the constitution the original sovereign state, which ordains the 
constitution both of government and of liberty.’”52 Thus in Burgess’s formulation, 
the sovereign is “that which imposes the limitation.”53 Such is the nature of 
sovereignty; in moments of emergency, the state might overturn its own limits, 
concentrating the whole of its capacity, unrestrained, on saving its own life. But 
although this seems similar to Schmitt’s “exception,” Thomas argues, it is founded 
in political science, not political theology—on a claim to reason grounded 
empirically in space and time (the space and time of the state) rather than on a 
secular equivalence to the action of an unbound God. Thomas nevertheless faults 
both Schmitt and Burgess, from which follows the second of his moves: the 
likening of law to rhetoric rather than science or theology. Still, Burgess’s political 
science seems more amenable to debate—and thus an opening to rhetoric—than 
Schmitt’s political theology. Hence, Thomas hopes, “the relentless hermeneutics 
of suspicion that has characterized much recent critical legal history” will be 
alleviated by the provision of his alternative.54 
In the second essay in this group, “Mannheim’s Pendulum: Refiguring Legal 
Cosmopolitanism,” Thomas Kemple continues our discussion of sovereignty 
while engaging in a double dose of innovation, both analytic and scopic. Kemple’s 
essay examines the concept of “legal cosmopolitanism” as a component of a 
discourse of cosmopolitanism emerging in the long aftermath of World War II. 
Public intellectual commentary on the cosmopolitan perspective treats it as a 
fundamental inversion of the legacy of Westphalian state sovereignty, in that it 
 
49. CARL SCHMITT, POLITICAL THEOLOGY: FOUR CHAPTERS ON THE CONCEPT OF 
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51. JOHN W. BURGESS, RECONSTRUCTION AND THE CONSTITUTION 1 (1902). 
52. Thomas, supra note 17, at 251 (quoting 1 BURGESS, supra note 50, at 57). 
53. 1 BURGESS, supra note 50, at 53. 
54. Thomas, supra note 17, at 242. 
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renders human or even natural rights ontologically prior to the system of 
international law that privileges “the historico-political and geocultural framework 
of the occidental nation-state and its ‘European experimental protocol.’”55 The 
marker of inversion is taken to be the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 
1948 and its “pledge to protect fundamental freedoms and promote personal 
dignity independently of and ultimately beyond the borders of the nation-state,”56 
superseding, or at least supplementing, the individual civic rights associated with 
nation-state sovereignty. Examining legal cosmopolitanism from the perspective 
of the sociology of knowledge, Kemple compares and contrasts three distinct 
ways in which the concept can be and has been configured to convey credible 
ideas and valued beliefs in social, cultural, and natural domains: as an expanding 
sphere of influence radiating outward concentrically from a metropolitan core, 
which he terms a Stoic vision and associates with the work of Martha Nussbaum; 
as a process of social intelligence constantly oscillating or vacillating back and 
forth between poles of ideology (“the thought-form that present reality invalidates 
as outdated”57) and utopia (“the thought-form that present reality invalidates as 
being premature”58), which he terms the vision projected by modern liberalism; 
and as displaced patterns of thought within intersecting social circles, “the 
standpoint of the exile and stranger who does not just wander aimlessly through 
the city like the traveler, the pilgrim, or the trader,” but moves purposefully 
“inside, outside, and along the edges of multiple social circles” locating thought 
“in expanding and intersecting spheres of interaction and influence,”59 which he 
analogizes to the standpoint of the ancient Cynics. Arrestingly, Kemple maps each 
representation of cosmopolitan consciousness figuratively to produce their distinct 
socialities in spatial form. This figurational approach to legal-intellectual history 
attempts to demonstrate graphically what is novel about the inner conceptual 
structure and political implications of the resurgence of “legal cosmopolitanism” 
in contemporary intellectual debate. 
The third essay in this group also undertakes a study of emergence, in this 
case “of a new regulation of death and dying.”60 In “Humane Killing and the 
Ethics of the Secular: Regulating the Death Penalty, Euthanasia, and Animal 
Slaughter,” Shai Lavi examines the production over time, through regulation, of 
three new ways of death, each a case of “humane” killing—death without 
suffering, an aesthetically commodious death—and, as a result, their convergence. 
Lavi asks, 
First, since when has it become possible to consider the death penalty, 
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euthanasia for the terminally ill, and animal killing within the same ethical 
and legal grid and to apply similar modes of execution to these radically 
different bodies? Second, how has it come about that in all three cases 
our laws and ethics separate the question of the legitimacy of killing from 
the legitimacy of methods of killing, shifting their focus from the former to 
the latter?61 
Lavi’s responses stress the range of meanings that can be found in humane 
killing. Secularization—Weber’s demise of the sacred62—is one explanation, but it 
is challenged by René Girard’s claims for the continuance of the sacred63 and by 
Schmitt’s recuperation of it.64 Foucauldian biopower offers a second and distinct 
response.65 Norbert Elias’s civilizing process is a third.66 Lavi’s own conclusion is 
to accept the secular, but in its own right rather than as a refusal of the religious; 
as a cosmology, that is, that can support an ethics of the humane. His point—one 
he has explored in earlier writing67—is that we should not take the accepted sense 
of “secular” at face value. To do so is to place the secular in binary (zero-sum) 
relations with the sacred, disenchantment with enchantment, and thereby distort 
both the conditions and the meaning of its emergence. 
Mariana Valverde’s “The Rescaling of Feminist Analyses of Law and State 
Power: From (Domestic) Subjectivity to (Transnational) Governance Networks,” 
the final essay in this group, charts innovation in a distinct form—theoretical 
innovation in feminist legal studies that, over a thirty-year period of development, 
entailed a certain transformative loss of a specific kind of critical purchase. A 
fascinating intellectual history of thirty years of feminist legal theory, Valverde 
calls to our attention a twofold transformation: a change in “the locale privileged 
by theory,” from the local to the transnational;68 and a change in the object of 
theoretical attention, from “the everyday subjectivity or consciousness of ordinary 
metropolitan folk” to the nonsubjective and nonhuman—“flows, networks, 
governance assemblages, and so forth.”69 Together, the two components add up 
to a “scale shift” with real consequences for feminist legal studies: an 
abandonment of “the gendered troubles of ordinary white American women” as 
the object of attention in favor of “exotic locations in which women can be easily 
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imagined, by Western feminists, as essentially and inherently victimized merely by 
virtue of being women”;70 and an abandonment of “gendered subjectivity” or 
consciousness as the object of critical feminist theorizing in favor of the array of 
queries emanating from legal geography, actor-network theory, and the sociology 
of networks: “spaces, flows, and networks.”71 Neither component of Valverde’s 
scale shift is a phenomenon particular to feminist legal studies; each permeates the 
entire socio-legal field, and indeed beyond. Nor does Valverde lament the shift. 
But she strongly recommends that we register what was lost: “analyses of the 
everyday subjectivity of ordinary women that gave us the critique not only of 
marriage but also of contractualism and the critique of unpaid housewifely 
labor.”72  
IV. POSSIBILITIES 
The essays in our final group engage, to a greater extent than elsewhere in 
this collection, with the constellations that history can create between past (both 
recent and remote) and present. Thereby, each addresses the possibilities (and 
liabilities) of the perspectives emerging from the “law as . . .” enterprise for a 
knowledge that is both practical and critical of the here and now: “[T]he moment, 
it might be said, when the origins of the present ‘jut manifestly and fearsomely 
into existence,’ spirit into experience, metaphysics into materiality.”73 
The first essay in this group, Prabha Kotiswaran’s “Beyond Sexual 
Humanitarianism: A Postcolonial Approach to Anti-Trafficking Law,” can be read 
as a response to the last essay of the previous group, Mariana Valverde’s 
“Rescaling,” in that it confirms the scale shift that Valverde describes and 
simultaneously proposes to rescue feminist legal studies from the shift’s most 
negative effects by reintroducing—in theory’s new locale of the transnational—
precisely that attention to local subjectivity/consciousness that Valverde shows 
got lost in theory’s scale shift. Kotiswaran’s essay addresses a crucial subject of 
contemporary feminist attention, trafficking, but from a perspective quite distinct 
from the occidental/metropolitan standpoint that has essentialized Africa and 
Asia, as Valverde put it, as “sites of extreme gender oppression.”74 Carefully and 
empirically, Kotiswaran engages in a research exercise designed to “de-
exceptionalize”75 trafficking and sex work by locating them, respectively, as 
instances of larger processes of migration and work, subject to the same patterns 
of coercion, consent, and exploitation. In particular, Kotiswaran deploys both 
experience and ethnography to examine the local activities of sex workers in 
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counteracting trafficking through self-regulation. Her conclusion is that 
antitrafficking law has possibilities, but only if assimilated to transnational 
regulation of labor markets, on the one hand, and local labor market self-
regulation, on the other. “Ultimately, the recognition of the varied stakes that 
developing and developed countries have in anti-trafficking law, and the 
reorientation of anti- trafficking law away from a criminalization model to a labor 
model, may indeed prove to be a crucial axis around which the success of the 
U.N. Protocol hinges.”76 
The second essay in this group, by Nomi Stolzenberg, also returns us to a 
subject already traversed earlier in this collection, in her case in the essays by 
Brook Thomas and (to a lesser extent) Shai Lavi. Like Thomas, Stolzenberg 
addresses the legal academy’s current fascination with political theology; unlike 
him she sees possibilities in political theology, but only if political theology is first 
transformed by purging its illiberal associations. Her “Political Theology with a 
Difference” is an exploration of the possibility that the discourse of political 
theology can indeed be sustained but its connections to Carl Schmitt severed. It 
proposes “a liberal conception of political theology, one that has at its core a 
principle of accommodation to human differences—to differences in historical 
and cultural circumstances and to differences in individual and group practices and 
beliefs.”77 The foundation for this liberal conception is the doctrine of divine 
accommodation, an idea enshrined, true enough, in millennia of Christian and 
Jewish theology, but derived from more remote traditions of classical rhetoric that 
identified accommodation as a principle of textual exegesis. By reconstructing the 
genealogy of the idea of accommodation, Stolzenberg exposes its expansionist 
quality.78 Equally important, she shows that its hermeneutic applications render 
religious notions of accommodation essentially secular in outlook, in that “divine 
accommodation” means an accommodation of God to human capacities, 
limitations, and institutions. In a nutshell, the “unavoidable gap between human 
knowledge and the divine law and the consequent necessity for man to establish 
and follow secular authorities and law” meant on the one hand “that secular 
government and law are divinely ordained,” and on the other “that the state and 
its law must be secular—secular in the very specific sense that they cannot be based 
upon or reflective of divine law.”79 Strikingly, this means “[a]ll secular law, on this 
(theological) account, is emergency law. All states are emergency states. . . . What 
looks from one point of view like the state of exception, a state of pure power 
unbounded by law, is, from another point of view, nothing more or less than 
ordinary law[,] . . . secular law[;]” that is “man-made law that reflects God’s 
accommodation to human beings’ needs and imperfections,” which “make it 
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impossible for them to follow, enforce, or even recognize the content of the 
divine law.”80 Stolzenberg’s intriguing argument places her alongside Thomas and 
his appeal to rhetoric, and Lavi and his emphasis on the apposition (not 
opposition) of the secular and the sacred. Notably, in addition, it creates an 
innovative genealogy not only for political theology but also for liberalism. 
The third and fourth essays in this group draw the collection as a whole to a 
close, and together furnish it with something of a conclusion. In a project 
canvassing the potential for history to serve as an interface for the interdisciplinary 
study of law, it is appropriate to note that each of the two final essays explicitly 
embraces history as practice and/or arena. Yet it is also noteworthy that the 
terrain each principally occupies is the terrain of jurisprudence. 
In “How to Speak Well of the State: A Rhetoric of Civil Prudence,” Jeffrey 
Minson offers us a considered argument for a secular ethic of the state. Civil 
prudence, Minson states, comprises “a jurisprudential ethic for a sovereign state 
defined by two responsibilities: protecting its citizenry from external or internal 
evils, and fostering sociability.”81 Its genre is rhetorical and dispassionately 
historical—historical, that is, in the particular form of the contextual history that 
“emerged in Western Christendom as a competitor to sacred philosophical 
history,”82 that is, Heilsgeschichte. We have here, seemingly, a grounded reiteration 
of Stolzenberg’s arguments for the nature of the state and the genealogy of 
liberalism. But, we should note, it is not an argument for liberalism. First, the civil 
prudential state is “explicit in respect to police powers”; second, “it binds itself”; 
third, as an arena of action it is “immanent.”83 Minson’s argument for the civil 
prudential state is cold, even bleak. He appraises moral “disgust”84 with the 
sovereign state and answers it with pragmatism: “Civil prudence strives to take 
account of what actually lies within the capabilities of modern states to 
problematize, correct, cope with, and improve.”85 We may take this as a warning 
against too enthusiastic an embrace of the rehabilitation of metaphysics that “law 
as . . .” has manifested.86 
We end with Shaun McVeigh’s elegiac invocation of the responsibilities of 
jurisprudence and the jurisprudent. McVeigh’s “Law As (More or Less) Itself: On 
Some Not Very Reflective Elements of Law” is a commentary on the present state 
of our sense of lawfulness that is also, like Jeffrey Minson’s essay, remarkably 
clear-eyed in its assessment of what can actually be expected of law, and of 
history, in the current conjuncture. Substantively concerned with the treatment of 
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indigenous bodies stolen from (in this case) Australian homelands and transported 
to the museums and hospitals of the colonizing metropolis, McVeigh’s essay 
considers the possibility wherein the repatriation of indigenous remains might 
become a site of meeting and engagement—between indigenous and 
nonindigenous people, and between indigenous and nonindigenous law. McVeigh 
is overwhelmingly concerned with law as a mode of conduct, as a means to 
express relations of acknowledgment, respect, and honor. He considers both the 
capacity for law and laws to manifest such relations and the foreclosure of that 
capacity on the jurisdictional terrains of settlement, so carefully constructed to 
deny concomitance to indigenous people and law. The account is, as he says, “in 
many respects, unhappy.”87 What saves it from hopelessness is, first, the 
possibility that the jurisprudent will become, and remain, alive to the 
responsibilities of lawful conduct; and second, the undercurrent of McVeigh’s 
own respect for the potential of the common law to recognize the laws of others, 
to acknowledge intersubjectivity. This may strike some as odd at the end of a 
century (and in a country—the United States) in which the common law mentality 
has been so thoroughly rinsed out of our sense of legality by legislative (and socio-
legal) positivism that only a few traces of it are left.88 All the more reason, then, to 
be reminded that “the jurisprudences of jurisdiction have contributed to the 
creation of a meeting of laws in a lawful rather than a lawless way,” of the 
possibility that in the common law tradition lies a trace of such a jurisprudence, 
and hence, concomitantly, of the particular responsibility adhering to “those who 
live their lives through the common law tradition . . . to give place to the dead.”89 
CONCLUSION 
To the extent it is an identifiable intellectual tendency in legal studies, “law 
as . . .” is barely three years old. As a label, it has been applied only to the two 
symposia held at the University of California, Irvine School of Law in 2010 and 
2012, and to the resulting collections of essays published in the UC Irvine Law 
Review. Nor might the authors of many of those essays feel it seemly to have their 
work appropriated to the banner of some upstart intellectual tendency. 
Scholarship being what it is, most of the essays published in these two collections 
were maturing long before anyone thought of the “law as . . .” marque. They are 
the fruit of years (if not decades) of individual thought and research, not of a 
sudden flash of inspiration brought on by a samizdat circulated “call for papers.” 
Yet for all that, and for all the initial desire to avoid conclusory foreclosure,90 
it is a responsibility of sponsors to attempt some provisional assessment of what 
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the “becoming” of “law as . . .” may turn out to be. It seems to be a combination 
of two elements, one underlined in the first collection, the other present there but 
emerging more strongly in this second collection. The first element, 
unsurprisingly, is history. The task of history is to attempt in its myriad ways to 
identify that which conceals in order to open up to discovery that which is 
concealed. Nothing is more concealing than legality, the magical power that makes 
so much—including itself—disappear.91 
But if our practice is indispensably historical, does this mean that we have 
after all done nothing more than sign on once again for another dose of 
Holmesian antifoundationalism, another dip in the acid bath that dissolves 
everything into nothing?92 Are we simply repeating ourselves—the fate of the 
modern?93 I think not, for three reasons—all present, if somewhat latently, in the 
first collection, and all more clearly evident in this collection, comprising together 
the second element of what “law as . . .” is becoming. First, historical dissolution 
is never complete. It always leaves residues, both material and ideal. These are the 
“concealed” substrate traces that are opened for discovery.94 Second, our 
historical practice is not definitionally antifoundational; it has more strings to play 
on than historicism and its determined temporal contextualizations.95 It is alert to 
multiple temporalities, not least that of duration. It is alert to metaphysics, 
precisely because it understands the “now” of the present to be one of the most 
critical interpellators of what is past.96 Finally, our practice is more than simply 
that of history. Perhaps the most important lesson of this collection is that “law 
as . . .” can become a jurisprudence.97 
What kind of jurisprudence it can become is not yet clear. I have my own 
ideas,98 but so—no doubt—do others. We must be content to wait and see what 
possibilities “law as . . .” will produce, promise, and provoke. 
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